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Profitability improvements after the privatization of a 
large state-owned bank might come at the expense of 
reduced access to financial services for some groups, 
especially the rural poor. The privatization of Tanzania’s 
National Bank of Commerce provides a unique episode 
for studying this issue. The bank was split into the 
“new” National Bank of Commerce, a commercial bank 
that assumed most of the original bank’s assets and 
liabilities, and the National Microfinance Bank, which 
assumed most of the branch network and the mandate 
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to foster access to financial services. The new National 
Bank of Commerce’s profitability and portfolio quality 
improved although credit growth was slow, in line with 
privatization experiences in other developing countries. 
Finding a buyer for the National Microfinance Bank 
proved very difficult, although after years under contract 
management by private banking consultants, Rabobank 
of the Netherlands emerged as a purchaser. Profitability 
has since improved and lending has slowly grown, while 
the share of non-performing loans remains low.PURSUING EFFICIENCY WHILE MAINTAINING OUTREACH: 
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We alone bear responsibility for any mistakes and inaccuracies. We thank Antonio David, Michael Fuchs, 
and Colin Xu who provided very helpful comments. I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 31, 2000, the Government of Tanzania sold 70 percent of the shares of 
the newly formed NBC (or National Bank of Commerce 1997, named after the 
predecessor bank)
1 for $18.8 million to ABSA Group of South Africa. Roughly five 
years later, on September 30, 2005, 49 percent of the shares of National Microfinance 
Bank (NMB) were sold to Rabobank of the Netherlands for $29 million. By themselves, 
these two transactions are not particularly newsworthy – the average sale value for 283 
banking privatizations from 1985 to 2003 was roughly $500 million (Megginson, 2005) – 
but, we argue, they are important because of the privatization method and the context in 
which it occurred. In Tanzania, as in other African countries, banking sectors tended to 
be highly concentrated throughout the 1990s (Table 1 and Figure 1), and often heavily 
influenced or even dominated by one or a handful of state-owned banks (Table 2 and 
Figure 2).
2 Such state-owned banks also tended to have the largest branch networks and 
thus support much of the payments system. Their privatization, therefore, presente
political dilemma because post-privatization performance improvements could have 





                                                
What makes this privatization remarkable is that the Tanzanian government 
adopted a restructuring plan that split the original National Bank of Commerce into two 
banks, the ‘new’ NBC and NMB. NBC was designed to be a commercial bank with 
business lines targeted to commercial enterprises and to individuals, primarily in urban 
centers. NMB, on the other hand, was designed to continue providing access to financial 
services in Tanzania’s rural areas, as well as to relatively poor individuals in urban 
centers. In order for NMB to fulfill this mission, a majority of the vast branch network 
from the original National Bank of Commerce was assigned to NMB: 95 branches went 
to NMB, compared with only 35 for the new NBC. Whereas the new NBC attracted the 
 
1 Since the name National Bank of Commerce was used for the original bank prior to its split in 1997 and is 
also used for one of the successor banks, this article uses the acronym NBC only to refer to the successor 
bank formed in 1997. The bank’s full name is used to refer to the original institution prior to its split. 
2 These figures may understate the level of state influence in African banking because, in some cases, the 
government is able to remain in control of banks in which it owns less than a majority of shares. For 
example, Kenya Commercial Bank is 26 percent state owned, but the remaining shares are widely dispersed 
and thus the government in effect continues to appoint the bank’s board of directors. 
  1ABSA Group as its purchaser, NMB initially attracted no interest from buyers. As 
described in more detail below, private banking consultants were contracted to manage 
NMB over a period of years, and only in 2005 was 49 percent of NMB’s shares sold to 
Rabobank, a large Dutch cooperative bank with international experience in microfinance. 
The original National Bank of Commerce, therefore, faced many of the 
difficulties associated with privatizations of large commercial banks in other countries. 
Entrenched interests that benefit from a state bank (e.g., through heavily subsidized loans, 
loans that are automatically renewed, or loans where repayment is not truly expected) 
have strong incentives to oppose the privatization process. Indeed, a growing body of 
evidence indicates that political influences help account for the under-performance of 
state-owned banks. Sapienza (2004) demonstrates that the interest rates charged on the 
loans of Italian state-owned banks are substantially lower than those charged by private 
banks, and are strongly negatively related to the local power of the political party that 
controls the bank. Dinc (2005) finds that government-owned banks increase their lending 
substantially in election years, significantly more than do private banks. Mian 
(forthcoming) shows that government largesse permits sustained under-performance on 
the part of state-owned banks: credit ratings data indicate that their deposits costs are 
lower because of the strong external support they receive from the government in times 
of trouble, and their balance sheets display much less sensitivity to macroeconomic 
shocks than those of private banks, presumably because they (and their borrowers) are 
insulated from such shocks by government financial support.  
Moreover, there is growing evidence that political factors help determine the 
timing and nature of privatization, which could impact post-privatization performance. 
Boehmer, Nash, and Netter (2005) find that, in developing countries, bank privatization is 
more likely the more accountable the government is to the general electorate rather than 
to specific interest groups. Clarke and Cull (2002) find that higher levels of 
unemployment and a larger proportion of public sector employees reduced the probability 
that Argentine provinces privatized their banks. Clarke and Cull (2005) find that 
Argentine provinces with large fiscal deficits agreed to bank privatization contracts that 
allowed more layoffs and guaranteed a larger share of the privatized bank’s portfolio, but 
in return received higher sales prices. 
  2Although a substantial body of empirical research supports the notion that state-
owned banks do not perform as well as privately-owned banks (for an overview see 
Megginson, 2005a),
3 entrenched interests could conceivably derail the privatization 
process entirely or produce transactions with terms that render post-privatization 
performance improvement impossible. And, in fact, not all bank privatizations have 
resulted in improved performance. There is, however, an emerging pattern to the results 
from developing countries. Performance improvements have tended to be more 
pronounced when (1) government fully relinquishes control, preferably fully divesting its 
shareholding; (2) a bank is sold to a strategic investor, instead of via share issue 
privatization, which often results in dispersed shareholding; and (3) bidding is open to all, 
including foreign-owned banks (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2005; Megginson, 2005a). 
These conditions were met in the sale to ABSA, and thus we would have expected the 
new NBC to have a reasonable chance for post-privatization performance improvement. 
However, it is unlikely that the NBC privatization could have occurred had not 
NMB been created to help mobilize public support sufficient to overcome opposition 
from the entrenched interests that benefited from the original NBC. There have been 
other studies of bank privatizations in developing countries in which the authorities have 
pursued both efficiency and outreach objectives.
4 But to our knowledge, this is the first 
case to be studied in which the access and efficiency objectives reside in separate post-
privatization institutions. For these reasons, our narrative explaining the difficulties of 
achieving privatization when mandates are split, and the empirical analysis benchmarking 
NBC and NMB performance relative to other banks in Tanzania is of potentially broader 
                                                 
3 Using cross-level data, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the level of state 
ownership in banking in 1970 is negatively associated with financial development, real growth, and 
productivity in 1995. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, b; 2004) find that greater state ownership is 
associated with reduced bank portfolio quality and profitability, and with lower levels of financial sector 
development. Using bank-level data from over 1600 banks in 100 emerging economies, Mian 
(forthcoming) confirms that state-owned banks are significantly less profitable and have higher loan default 
rates than private banks, despite the fact that their deposit costs are substantially lower than private banks. 
There is also some evidence that state ownership is linked to higher probabilities of crisis, though the 
results are not highly robust (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, forthcoming).  Significant or not, those 
results do not support the idea that state ownership fosters greater banking sector stability, a rationale that 
some proponents of state banks have relied upon.  
4 For examples, see the analyses of the privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) by Clarke, Cull 
and Fuchs (2007) and of the Agricultural Bank of Mongolia (now named Khan Bank) by Dyer, Morrow 
and Young (2004). 
  3significance for developing countries, especially to policy makers considering the 
privatization of a large state-owned bank in a relatively concentrated banking system. 
To analyze profitability-outreach tensions, our research strategy is first to test 
whether NBC improved its profitability after privatization relative to other Tanzanian 
banks using bank-level indicators (return on assets and the share of non-performing 
loans). We also do the same benchmarking exercise for NMB, but its long period under 
contract management and the short time since its sale to Rabobank might depress its 
profitability relative to other banks, or at least make profitability improvement difficult to 
detect in regressions. Next, on outreach, we perform similar tests using bank-level 
indicators for credit growth, the ratio of loans to deposits, and the share of assets devoted 
to government securities. Given its mandate, we might expect NMB to perform relatively 
well on these dimensions, while NBC might do less well. To the extent that we see 
improvements relative to other banks in profitability and declines in outreach for NBC, 
we will take it as evidence consistent with post-privatization profitability-outreach 
tensions. To the extent that NMB has achieved relatively deep outreach but is not highly 
profitable, we also see evidence of those tensions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides 
information on the development of the Tanzanian banking sector and on the context in 
which the privatization was carried out. Section III describes the privatization itself. 
Section IV briefly discusses our data and the empirical methods that we use, while 
section V summarizes our regression results. Section VI offers robustness checks of those 
regression results. Section VII concludes and attempts to draw policy lessons for bank 
privatizations in other developing countries. 
II. CONTEXT IN TANZANIA AT THE OUTSET  
From the mid 1960s onward Tanzania followed economic policies in the 
communist mold, with centralized controls and direct state investment in all sectors of the 
economy. After two decades, faced with increasingly inefficient parastatal companies and 
an economic crisis, the Government of Tanzania initiated a program of economic 
liberalization in the mid 1980s and began an on-off process of structural adjustment and 
policy reforms. Despite uneven domestic political support for the reforms, the 
  4macroeconomic situation in Tanzania improved consistently. Inflation, as a key indicator 
of macroeconomic stability, fell throughout the late 1990s. Average inflation was 27.4 
percent in 1995, fell to 7.9 percent in 1999 and has averaged about 4 percent since 2000, 
in line with the Bank of Tanzania’s target (EIU 2005). However, despite an improvement 
in overall economic performance, Tanzania remained (and remains today) a very poor 
country even by the standards of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly outside of the main 
urban centers. 
Starting in the early the 1990s, the Government of Tanzania implemented a series 
of reforms aimed at reducing its dominant role in the financial sector. With the passage of 
the Banking and Financial Institutions Act in 1991 private banks were permitted and the 
Bank of Tanzania was vested with supervisory and regulatory controls to ensure the 
development of prudent banking activities. The first privately-owned banks began 
operating in Tanzania in 1993. However, collectively the private banks occupied merely a 
niche of the market, offering financial services almost exclusively in and around Dar Es 
Salaam. The banking sector continued to be dominated by the original, state-owned 
National Bank of Commerce 
with over 80 percent of the 
market share in deposits. 
Box 1: Privatization timeline 
 
1991:   Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
passed 
1993:  Foreign, privately-owned banks licensed 
1996:  First state-owned bank privatized through 
Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange  
1997:  The state-owned National Bank of 
Commerce split, into NBC and NMB 
1998:  NBC and NMB offered for sale – no bids 
received for NMB 
1999:  ABSA agrees to buy NBC (sale finalized in 
2000); management of NMB taken over by 
contracted consultants 
2003:  NMB Board replaced by President Mkapa 
2005:  49 percent of NMB shares sold – 
Rabobank takes over day-to-day operations 
of NMB 
In 1996, the Cooperative 
and Rural Development Bank 
(CRDB) became the first state-
owned bank to be privatized. 
With around 5 percent market 
share in deposits, CRDB was far 
less politically controversial as a 
privatization candidate than the 
original National Bank of 
Commerce. CRDB was re-
capitalized and its shares sold on 
the newly formed stock market. 
  5III. THE BANK PRIVATIZATION 
A. The Original National Bank of Commerce and ‘The Split’ 
The privatization of the original National Bank of Commerce was first discussed 
almost ten years before its eventual sale, following the report of the Presidential Banking 
Commission in 1990, which prompted the overall reforms in the financial sector. The 
possibility of splitting the dominant National Bank of Commerce into smaller component 
banks and privatizing them separately to different buyers was considered from the start. 
However, instead of splitting and privatizing the Bank, as the Presidential Commission’s 
report recommended (cited in Abt 1999), the government decided to retain full ownership 
and to attempt to restructure it for a possible later sale. 
In order to turn the National Bank of Commerce around, the government was 
willing to invest considerable financial and political resources. Starting in 1991, several 
rounds of recapitalization and (arguably only tentative) restructuring were meant to 
reverse its fortunes. Before the National Bank of Commerce would be split and privatized 
six years later, over 20 branches were closed, all but 2000 employees of the original staff 
of almost 10,000 were fired, the balance sheet was cleared of non-performing loans 
several times, and the total amount of recapitalization reached $183.6 million, at an 
annual servicing expense of $20.1 million (Abt 1999). Nevertheless, these efforts failed 
to stop the ongoing losses. When the National Bank of Commerce failed to adhere to a 
stringent business plan throughout 1995, the Bank of Tanzania – increasingly in a 
position to carry out its regulatory functions – initiated the privatization. After prolonged 
and highly politicized deliberations that took almost two years, the government decided 
to split the original National Bank of Commerce into two banks, the new NBC and NMB. 
On September 30, 1997, the staff, assets, and liabilities of the original National Bank of 
Commerce were transferred to the two successor banks.
5 
It is useful to emphasize that the two successor banks to the original National 
Bank of Commerce were endowed with distinctly different missions. The new NBC was 
conceived as a bank in the conventional mold and as a direct competitor to the private 
(mostly foreign) banks already operating in Tanzania. To this end, all lending products of 
                                                 
5 The split of the original National Bank of Commerce also involved the creation of a third entity, a holding 
company, which did not impact the two successor banks significantly and is not further discussed here. 
  6the original National Bank of Commerce were assigned to the new NBC. NMB, on the 
other hand, was to ensure access to financial services among the traditionally underserved 
population, primarily in rural areas of Tanzania and was given the majority of the branch 
network to do so. NMB’s mandate was crucial. With Tanzania’s history of direct state 
provision of services, much of the credibility of the privatization and of the financial 
sector reforms more generally, depended on the ability of NMB to carry out its mandate 
as well as, or better than, the original National Bank of Commerce had done. The leading 
advocates of reform were acutely aware that among Tanzanians the privatization’s 
success would be judged primarily by the degree to which NMB would be able to 
continue providing financial services in rural areas.
6 
B. NBC Privatization 
After the split of the original National Bank of Commerce into the new NBC and 
NMB in 1997, NBC was still a big bank with over 30 percent market share of total bank 
deposits in Tanzania. It compared favorably with the main (foreign) competitor banks, 
Stanbic, Citibank, and Standard Chartered. When the two successor banks were offered 
for sale in 1998, NMB did not attract any interest. For NBC, ABSA of South Africa was 
chosen as the buyer in the latter half of 1999, and the sale was completed on March 31, 
2000.
7 
In line with what had worked best in other bank privatizations (as discussed above 
and analyzed in Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2005; Megginson, 2005a), bidding for NBC 
was open to banks with an interest in becoming a strategic investor committed for the 
long-term. Since no sufficiently large Tanzanian banks existed, this meant that only 
foreign banks could bid, which helped stir suspicion surrounding the privatization itself. 
Critics lamented a seemingly bargain sale of the economy’s “fountainhead,” as 
Tanzania’s founding President Julius Nyerere used to call the original National Bank of 
Commerce, to foreigners. A sale of the bank to the public, analogous to CRDB’s sale, 
would likely have been far more popular. Despite these political pressures, the sale of 
NBC was carried out as intended. 
                                                 
6 Based on several conversations with key players in the privatization process. 
7 The Tanzanian government did not fully relinquish its shareholding, retaining 30 percent, though it did 
cede majority control of the bank. The International Finance Corporation partnered with ABSA taking 
15 percent of the shares, which left ABSA with 55 percent. 
  7ABSA replaced the senior management of NBC with expatriates and began 
investing heavily in building the IT infrastructure and the capacity of its own staff. The 
first order of business was to stop the losses that were a constant in NBC’s history. The 
majority of the loan portfolio was written off when ABSA bought the bank and the 
government took over most of the non-performing loans.
8 As our results below show in 
greater detail, ABSA managed to turn around NBC’s profitability quite rapidly and has 
managed since then to keep both profitability and the level of non-performing loans on 
par with other private banks. While overall staffing decreased in the initial years after the 
sale, from about 1200 down to 800, NBC has begun to grow again more recently, with 
additional branches opening and staffing numbers increasing.
9 
C. Pre-privatization: NMB under Contracted Management 
Compared to the sale of the newly formed NBC, the privatization of NMB was 
more challenging and its relative success to date all the more instructive. When the initial 
attempt to sell NMB in 1998 did not attract any interested parties, the government 
recognized that a successful sale of NMB would have to be preceded by the recruitment 
of professional bankers and microfinance experts to take over the management and 
transform NMB’s basic business line to focus on small-scale financial services. 
With the help of donor funding, a team of banking consultants were hired from 
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI). They took over the management of NMB in 
July 1999 and remained at the helm until September 2005. The original contract with 
DAI was to prepare the bank for privatization within three years. It was not the intention 
to have the consultants manage the bank for more than six years, as they ended up doing. 
The management contract with DAI was extended as a result of unforeseen delays in the 
privatization, which are discussed below. The mission of the consultants was to stabilize 
NMB and return it to profitability. While considerable investments in IT and training 
were identified to achieve this end, the managers were at the same time contractually 
obliged to refrain from making additional investments that would limit the options of a 
                                                 
8 In order to engender payment discipline, NBC has attempted to collect the loans on behalf of the 
Government and charges a 10 percent success fee. About a third of the written-off loans has been or 
currently is being recovered. 
9 Based partly on an interview with NBC management in February 2007. 
  8potential buyer.
10 This restriction therefore remained in place over six years. Had the sale 
been completed earlier, the new owners could have pursued IT improvements (and, 
perhaps, the bank’s mandate to extend access to financial services) earlier. 
At the outset, the management team insisted on a clear mandate and authority for 
management decisions from the Board of NMB and got it. Consultations with the labor 
unions ensured that they were not a disrupting factor at any point in the process. The 
consultants’ priorities for turning around NMB and securing its survival in the short term 
were threefold. First was the modernization of treasury operations; second, the urgent 
upgrades of the money transfer business as the primary source of NMB’s earnings; and 
third, the introduction of credit operations (i.e., microfinance products). To do this, 
investments in IT and in building the capacity of the staff were urgently needed. Among 
NMB’s staff of around 1000 employees, no more than 50 of them had ever worked with a 
computer or even knew how to turn it on. With a continued focus on internal capacity 
building the management team pursued these priorities in the following months. Treasury 
operations were upgraded. The time for money transactions was brought down from 30 
days to 1 day and, subsequently, NMB’s government contract for handling payments 
nationwide was renewed. Without a single loan in its assets in 1999, an entirely new line 
of business and a corresponding corporate culture was introduced gradually. No loans at 
all were made in the first year. In the second year, lending was introduced at 9 NMB 
branches. In the third year, 18 NMB branches offered micro-loans, with the number of 
branches offering loans doubling every year after that. NMB loans have to be fully 
secured by collateral and are given out to individuals, mostly entrepreneurs with small or 
micro businesses. The loan amounts range from TZS 50,000 to TZS 5,000,000. 
11 
As the results from the quantitative analysis below show, NMB managed to keep 
the level of non-performing loans remarkably low, even as the loan portfolio expanded. 
Despite NMB’s mandate of providing access to financial services in rural areas, its 
                                                 
10 In the privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank, the new owners (Stanbic Bank of South Africa) got rid 
of the IT upgrades that the government pursued while readying the bank for sale. Kasekende (2004) and 
Clarke, Cull, and Fuchs (2007) conclude that such decisions were best left to the purchaser and did not 
increase the attractiveness of the bank to bidders. 
11 Based on phone conversations in April 2007 with Tony Singleton, the first contracted CEO of NMB and 
head of the DAI team, and with John Giles, the third contracted CEO and DAI leader in Tanzania. 
  9profitability was soon as good as other private domestic banks, a fact that would prove to 
be a mixed blessing for political reasons. 
D. NMB Sale – Delays and Success 
Political difficulties in maintaining support for the privatization led to delays and 
adjustments in the strategy for the privatization of NMB. The difficulties emerged on the 
government’s side, especially once NMB’s performance began to exceed expectations 
and profitability increased under the leadership of the hired consultants. The fundamental 
rationale behind the privatization did not always appear to be fully understood, either by 
the decision makers or by the public. The early privatizations were advertised as being a 
means to get rid of the “lemons” – the loss-making parastatal corporations – that were a 
drain on government resources. As NMB’s profitability increased, this justification for 
privatizing NMB became more difficult to maintain. 
In 2002, when privatization transaction consultants had already been hired to 
assist in the sale itself, the voices against the privatization of NMB became louder. The 
President, in an effort to maintain support for the privatization, insisted that the 
performance of NMB was sufficiently bad that its sale was necessary to save the state 
from further losses. At the height of the heated political debate, the Board of Directors of 
NMB, appointed by the President, publicly expressed its opposition to the privatization, 
calling for more local control of NMB than the government proposal allowed. The 
government (the Executive) responded by stating that the privatization would go forward 
without the Board. Finally, the President replaced the Board of Directors of NMB in its 
entirety. Although the replacement of the Board made sense from a corporate governance 
perspective, since the vocal opposition of the Board ran contrary to the wishes of the 
shareholders, President Mkapa ran a considerable risk by supporting the privatization so 
forcefully. 
The result of these political challenges, apart from the delay of one and a half 
years in the privatization, was an amended privatization strategy, as the government was 
unable to maintain support for the original plan of privatization. Instead of a sale of 70 
percent of NMB shares to a strategic investor, analogous to the sale of NBC to ABSA, 
the amended plan called for a sale of only 49 percent of NMB shares, with 51 percent of 
  10shares held by the government. 21 percent would be sold to Tanzanians at a later date. 
Notwithstanding the considerable difficulties in privatizing NMB, the consultants were 
able to hand over a bank with an established business model and a high level of outreach 
and profitability. 
In the end, 49 percent of shares were sold to a banking consortium led by 
Rabobank of the Netherlands on September 30, 2005, and the government relinquished 
control over the day-to-day management of NMB. Management responsibility was 
transferred to Rabobank and there have been no indications that the government intends 
to reclaim any direct influence over the management of NMB. The sale price ($29 
million) was what earlier evaluations had estimated. Importantly, the bid documents did 
not contain any branch closure prohibition. This is at least partly due to a study 
commissioned for the sale itself that found, somewhat contrary to expectations, that the 
vast majority of NMB’s branches were indeed profitable. 
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
We use quarterly balance sheet and income statement data for the 42 banks that 
operated in Tanzania at any point between December 1998 and December 2006 to test 
whether the privatization of the two successor banks to the original National Bank of 
Commerce resulted in improved performance. Specifically, we use the following 
regression to summarize the evolution of NBC, NMB, and the banking sector as a whole 
in terms of profitability and portfolio quality: 
Yit = α + β1NBC(PRE)it + β2NBC(POST)it + β3NMB(Contract Management)it +         (1) 
β3NMB(Rabobank)it + β5SIZEit + β5FOREIGNit + β6GOVTit + β7LOAN SHAREit+ 
β8Gov Securities SHAREit + β9YEARit+ β10QUARTERit + εit 
Y is one of the two bank performance measures mentioned above for bank i in 
quarter-year t. FOREIGN is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank is foreign-owned, 
while GOVT equals one if a bank is state-owned.
12  Private domestic ownership is 
                                                 
12 Ownership is determined by the majority shareholder. Banks are considered government owned as long 
as the government holds 50.1% or more of the bank’s shares as it did, for example, with NMB throughout 
the period (however, the NMB case is treated separately in the regressions via the NMB dummy variables 
in equation 1). Banks are considered foreign owned if 50.1% or more of shares are held by a foreign entity, 
such as a foreign bank, as was the case for NBC after its sale to ABSA. 
  11therefore the omitted category in our regressions. See Table 3 for a summary of the 
number of banks by type in each year and their summary statistics (size, profitability, and 
non-performing loan share). 
NBC(PRE) is a dummy variable equal to one for NBC observations throughout 
the period of study. Its coefficient measures the performance of NBC prior to 
privatization relative to banks in our omitted category, private domestic banks. 
NBC(POST) is a dummy equal to one for NBC observations after the sale to ABSA in 
December, 1999. The dummy set equal to one after privatization is a standard way to 
measure the effects of restructuring at the time of the transaction (thus the variable is 
labeled “NBC: at Privatization” in the tables) (See Berger et al. 2005). The NBC(POST) 
coefficient therefore measures performance differences relative to NBC’s pre-
privatization performance.
13 We also include a variable for the number of quarters since 
the privatization to pick up dynamic post-privatization performance effects. Its 
coefficient measures the average quarterly change in our performance indicators in the 
post-privatization period relative to NBC’s performance in the first post-privatization 
quarter.
14  
NMB(Contract Management) is a dummy equal to one for NMB observations 
throughout the period, since NMB was created prior to our period of study and contract 
management was already in place by mid-1999.
15  NMB(Rabobank) is a dummy equal to 
one after the sale to Rabobank in December 2005. The coefficient for NMB(Contract 
Management) therefore measures performance relative to private domestic banks prior to 
the sale to Rabobank. The NMB(Rabobank) dummy measures performance differences 
relative to the period under contract management. As with the NBC privatization, in our 
final specifications we separate the post-privatization effects across two variables, NMB 
at the time of privatization to Rabobank and the number of quarters since the 
privatization to capture dynamic effects.  
                                                 
13 By summing the coefficients for the NBC ‘prior to privatization’ and ‘at privatization’ dummies, we can 
also benchmark the initial post-privatization performance of Stanbic relative to our control group, private 
domestic banks. 
14 The coefficient (multiplied by the number of quarters since privatization) can also be added to the other 
two dummy variables to benchmark NBC’s post-privatization performance in a given quarter relative to our 
control group. 
15 Qualitative results are almost identical if NMB(Contract Management) is set equal to one beginning in 
July 1999, when the consultants actually arrived.  
  12SIZE is measured in total assets, and is included in the regression to control for 
potential scale economies. LOAN SHARE is the ratio of loans to total assets; Gov 
Securities SHARE is the ratio of government securities to total assets. These variables are 
included to control for banks’ business orientation and asset allocation strategies. All 
models also include yearly and quarterly dummy variables to account for cyclical or 
seasonal factors that affected all banks. Summary statistics for all of the variables used in 
the regressions are found in Table 4. 
V. RESULTS 
In this section, we present results from regressions that use profitability, portfolio 
quality, and asset portfolio orientation as dependent variables. We also provide figures 
summarizing the yearly evolution of those variables for NBC, NMB, and the rest of the 
banking system to help place the regression results in context. 
A.  Profitability 
We estimate our models using a robust clustering method that accounts for both 
heteroskedasticity and correlation across multiple observations from the same bank.
16 
Because observations from the same bank are likely to be correlated, OLS techniques can 
underestimate errors (thus overestimating significance levels). At the same time, the 
summary statistics in Table 4 indicate that there are some extreme values for some of the 
variables in our dataset. Therefore, as a robustness check we also present median 
                                                 
16 One might wonder why we do not incorporate bank-specific fixed effects in our regressions. Note that 
this is essentially what we are doing for NBC and NMB. Our ‘NBC: Pre-privatization’ variable captures the 
fixed effect, the ‘NBC: At privatization’ dummy variable and the ‘time since privatization’ variable capture 
changes relative to that fixed effect. Similarly, ‘NMB: At creation’ captures that bank’s fixed effect. The 
variables for ‘time since creation,’ ‘sale to Rabobank,’ and ‘time since sale to Rabobank’ capture changes 
relative to NMB’s fixed effect. 
 
What we do not incorporate in our base regressions is fixed effects for banks other than NBC and NMB. 
We do this because we want to benchmark the performance of NBC and NMB relative to a group of banks 
(private domestic banks). In this way the coefficients for ‘NBC: Pre-privatization’ and ‘NMB: At creation’ 
provide information about how those banks were performing relative the rest of the banking sector prior to 
the ownership changes and restructuring that would later take place. 
 
As a robustness check on our findings, we did run models that included fixed effects for all banks other 
than NBC and NMB. The effects of the changes in ownership were very similar to those presented in our 
based results in Table 5. For example, the results indicate that NBC improved its ROA at the time of 
privatization, and maintained that level thereafter, while NMB improved its profitability over time. NBC 
significantly reduced its NPLs at the time of privatization, and the median regression indicates that it 
continued to do so over time, while NMB maintained the same low level of NPLs throughout. In short, our 
conclusions are not altered by the inclusion of fixed effects for banks other NBC and NMB. 
  13regressions, which give less weight to outliers than OLS techniques.
17  We also lagged 
our explanatory variables one quarter to help address simultaneity problems. However, 
those results are not reported, since they are not substantively different (in terms of 
significance levels and the magnitude of significant coefficients) from the reported results 
without time lags. 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, the pre-privatization coefficient for NBC is 
negative (-0.021 and -0.016 relative to a sample mean of 0.035), indicating that NBC 
prior to its sale to ABSA was less profitable than private domestic banks. The NBC at 
privatization coefficient is positive, and of similar magnitude to the pre-privatization 
coefficient, indicating that the profitability deficit was erased upon privatization. Indeed, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients (pre- and post-
privatization) is zero, which implies no significant difference between private domestic 
banks and NBC after privatization. It is true that the coefficients for NBC are significant 
only in the median regressions, but the insignificance in the model with clustered 
standard errors is due to outliers for banks other than NBC and NMB.
18 As shown in 
Figure 3, the ROA figures for NBC and NMB are slightly above the middle of the 
distribution described in Table 4.
19 Note also that the time since privatization coefficient 
is insignificant in both columns 1 and 2 indicating that NBC’s profitability has remained 
on par with other private banks since privatization. 
The coefficients for NMB at creation are insignificant in models 1 and 2 
indicating that its profitability was on par with private banks at its inception. This might 
not be so surprising given that NMB inherited none of NBC’s portfolio problems in the 
split. However, the time since NMB creation variable is also insignificant in both models, 
which indicates that the bank maintained its profitability relative to private banks during 
its period under contract management. In the OLS model with clustered standard errors 
                                                 
17 A disadvantage of the median regression, of course, is that it does not deal with potential correlations 
between observations from the same bank. However, qualitative results are very similar to those for the 
median regression when we eliminate the top and bottom 5% of our observations and use the robust 
clustering method. 
18 When we eliminate the top and bottom 5% of our ROA observations and run OLS with clustered 
standard errors, we obtain qualitative results and significance levels very similar to those for the median 
regression in Column 2. We prefer the median regression because we can use the entire data set, rather than 
dropping observations based on an arbitrary cut-off. 
19 The median ROA value for NBC was .012, for NMB it was .013, and for the sample as a whole it was 
.008. 
  14(column 1), NMB profitability is significantly lower than other private banks upon its 
sale to Rabobank, which could reflect some initial dislocation associated with new 
management.
20 Although similar coefficients and significance levels are found for the 
clustered errors model when we drop the top and bottom 5 percent of our ROA 
observations (not shown in Table 5), those coefficients are not significant in the median 
regressions (column 2). At the least, however, it is safe to draw the conclusion that NMB 
has been about as profitable as other private domestic banks since its inception, which is 
impressive given its mandate. 
Bank size (total assets) is the only control variable that is significant in both 
models, a reflection of scale economies in Tanzanian banking. Foreign ownership is 
significant and negative in the median regression which has also been found in some 
other developing countries (Berger et al., 2005), though this is more common in 
developed countries (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Berger et al., 2000). The coefficient is, 
however, small in absolute value (-0.003). Also, foreign banks tended to be relatively 
large, especially at the tail end of the period (Table 3), so the negative foreign ownership 
coefficient is likely reflective of a handful of small unprofitable banks.  Finally, the share 
of assets devoted to lending is positive and significant in the median regression indicating 
that firms that focused on lending tended to earn high returns during this period. 
It should be noted that the R-squared is relatively low for the ROA regressions. 
Such a result is not surprising when a quarterly income statement variable (net income) 
that can fluctuate wildly is regressed on balance sheet variables (loans, assets, etc.) that 
tend to be more stable. When we run the regressions using yearly ROA data, the R-
squared increases slightly though the results remain qualitatively the same as in the 
reported regressions.
21 
B.  Portfolio Quality 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, the pre-privatization coefficient for NBC is 
positive and significant indicating that its share of non-performing loans was 20-30 
                                                 
20 See Berger et al. (2005) for similar results for Argentina. 
21 For the median regressions, we report the pseudo-R
2 statistic, which measures the proportion of the log-
likelihood value explained by the model's non-intercept independent variables, i.e., 1 - (log LΩ)/(log Lω), 
where LΩ denotes the likelihood value of estimation with all the exogenous variables and Lω denotes the 
likelihood value of estimation with only the intercept. Pseudo R
2 -squared statistics are therefore not 
directly comparable to ordinary R
2 statistics, and in our experience, can be relatively low. 
  15percent higher than that of the typical private domestic bank. After privatization, NBC’s 
share of non-performing loans declined dramatically, though the median regression in 
column 4 indicates that a substantial portion of the decline occurred at the time of the 
privatization, while the regression with clustered standard errors in column 3 indicates 
that the decline occurred more gradually.
22 The median regression results are more 
typical of those found in other developing countries, where non-performing assets are 
often removed from a state-owned bank’s portfolio just prior to privatization.
23 Both 
models indicate that NBC’s NPL share was on par with that of other private banks within 
five years of privatization.
24 This is also reflected in Figure 4, though convergence to 
private domestic banks’ level appears to be a bit quicker than is indicated by the 
regression.
25 
Both models indicate that NMB’s share of non-performing loans was significantly 
lower than that of private domestic banks when it was created. Again, this is because 
NMB did not inherit any of NBC’s problem assets in the split. However, both models 
also indicate that NMB maintained its relatively low share of non-performing loans in the 
post-privatization period. Moreover, the coefficients for the sale of NMB to Rabobank 
and the time since that sale are also insignificant, indicating that NMB still maintains its 
low NPL share. We speculate that this is because NMB makes collateralized 
microfinance loans which tend to instill high repayment rates (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). Regarding the control variables, both models indicate that government 
ownership of bank is associated a higher share of non-performing loans, while one model 
                                                 
22 It is not uncommon for the "at privatization" and "quarters since privatization" variables to compete for 
explanatory power in these types of regressions. Although the OLS regression loads that source of variation 
onto the "quarters since privatization variable," most of the cleaning of the balance sheet did, in fact, occur 
at the time of the privatization.  
23 See Beck et al. (2005) for evidence of steep declines in non-performing loan shares at the time of 
privatization in Nigeria, Berger et al. (2005) for Argentina, and Haber (2005) for Mexico. Looking at 81 
privatizations across 22 countries, Boubakri et al. (2005) also find evidence that credit risk declines after 
privatization, though some of these changes occur over time. 
24 For example, for the median regression model in column 4, NBC started with an NPL share .292 higher 
than private domestic banks, which was reduced by .127 to .165 at the time pf privatization. From that 
point the share declined .008 per quarter, reaching zero in roughly twenty quarters.  
25 For NBC, as has been the case in other bank privatizations, the absorption of NPLs at the time of and 
subsequent to privatization was a matter of negotiation with the government, extending beyond the time of 
the sale. That is, the purchaser was able to give back to the government additional non-performing loans 
after the privatization. This partially accounts for the additional post-privatization declines summarized in 
the regressions and Figure 4. 
  16indicates that foreign ownership is associated with a lower share. These results are also 
typical of those found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., in Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2001b, 2004). 
C.  Composition of Assets 
We lack detailed data on the composition of Tanzanian banks’ loan portfolios by 
economic sector. We do however know the share of each bank’s assets devoted to 
government securities and to loans, and these two variables shed light on the way NBC 
and NMB chose to deploy assets during the period of restructuring. Prior to the 
privatization, the coefficients for NBC indicate that it lent about as much as private 
domestic banks and held significantly fewer government securities. Upon privatization, 
both of those results were reversed: NBC’s portfolio was infused with government 
securities (presumably to replace non-performing assets) and its share of lending declined 
to a level below that of private domestic banks. In the quarters after privatization, the 
share of government securities has remained more or less constant (see also Figure 5), 
and the share of loans relative to assets has climbed steadily (Figure 6).
26  
Given the way NMB was created, it is little surprise that at its inception its 
balance sheet contained a high share of government securities relative to private domestic 
banks and a low share of loans. During the period of management by private banking 
consultants, the regressions indicate that the situation persisted. At the time of the sale to 
Rabobank, the share of assets comprised by government securities jumped higher, which 
is common in sales of public banks to private investors, as those investors are unwilling 
to buy a bank unless its balance sheet has been cleaned, and replacing non-performing 
assets with government securities is the most common method for doing so. Moreover, 
the increase in the ratio of government securities to total assets was relatively mild (12-13 
percentage points), and our regressions indicate that this ratio declined at a rate of three 
percentage points per quarter as NMB's other assets (especially loans) started to grow in 
the period since 2005. These conclusions are also consistent with Figures 5 and 6.  
In all, the base results indicate that NBC’s experience was typical of successful 
commercial bank privatizations in other developing countries. First, the privatization 
                                                 
26 Because we have relatively few pre-privatization observations, the NBC pre-privatization and NBC at 
privatization variables compete for explanatory power. Thus the relatively low level of loans/assets for 
NBC that in Figure 6 appears to be picked up by the NBC at privatization coefficient. 
  17shared the main features of other successful transactions: sale was to a strategic investor 
(rather than via a broader share issue privatization); foreign bidders participated in the 
negotiations for the bank, and indeed ABSA of South Africa won; and the government 
relinquished the majority of its shareholding. Second, post-privatization performance 
followed patterns seen in other countries: profitability and portfolio quality improved 
after privatization, in large part because the government replaced NBC’s non-performing 
loans with its own securities at the time of the privatization. NBC’s post-privatization 
lending is more prudent than when the bank was under state ownership, but that prudence 
has also meant slower growth in lending than might otherwise be the case.  
For NMB, the bank that received the bulk of NBC’s pre-privatization branch 
network and was charged with a mandate to foster access to financial services, the 
regression results paint a different picture. The primary struggle was to find a buyer for 
the bank. Under a lengthy period of management by private banking consultants, the 
bank was as profitable as other private banks and had a lower share of non-performing 
loans. At the same time, the bank’s assets tilted heavily towards government securities 
and away from loans. Once a reputable private owner was found, namely Rabobank, 
lending has begun gradually increasing (relative to assets). However, to achieve that sale 
the share of NMB’s assets devoted to government securities increased somewhat, and 
remains high.
27 These results highlight the difficulties of pursuing both improved 
efficiency and expanded access in the privatization of a dominant state-owned bank.  
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we control for de novo entry and mergers of banks because 
changes in the composition of our omitted category (private domestic banks) could be 
driving our base regression results. We also use real credit growth as an explanatory 
variable to better benchmark the credit extended by NMB and NBC relative to the rest of 
the banking system. 
 
                                                 
27 Note from Figure 5, however, that the increase in the share of government securities for NMB is about as 
large as that for the sector as a whole, so this was reflective of a sectoral trend. Accounting for this trend 
via the yearly dummy variables, the regressions indicate that NMB's ratio has been declining (i.e. the 
coefficient on "quarters since privatization" is negative and significant). 
 
  18A.  Controlling for Entry 
The ideal empirical tests would benchmark the performance of NBC and NMB 
over time relative to that of a static group of banks of the same ownership type. However, 
a quick glance at Table 3 indicates that there was substantial net entry during our sample 
period for foreign and private domestic banks. Those figures mask other changes in the 
roster of banks: six small banks were liquidated, and two mergers were consummated 
involving five banks. All of these cases affect the composition of the group of private 
domestic banks, our omitted category, and thus potentially affect the comparisons that we 
make between private banks, NBC, and NMB in the base regressions.  
We think this unlikely because the regression results and figures conform so well 
to the narrative description of the privatization, but it is possible. We therefore create new 
categories of banks to perform our robustness checks. The first three are for banks that 
appeared in the sample in all quarters, one for private domestic (Private full sample), 
foreign (Foreign full sample), and state banks (State full sample). The next three are for 
new entrants, one for each type of ownership (private entry, foreign entry, state entry). 
These dummy variables equal one from the time the bank enters the sample. For each 
type of entrant we also include a variable for the time since entry (e.g., Quarters since 
Private Entry) to capture dynamic performance effects. A seventh category is for banks 
that are liquidated; the corresponding variable (Liquidated) equals one until the bank 
leaves the sample.  
The final category is for banks that were involved in mergers or acquisitions. We 
follow the method in Berger et al. (1998) by combining the pre-merger financial data for 
all banks that would eventually be party to the merger/acquisition to create a pro-forma 
bank.
28 We can therefore test whether the performance of the same pool of banking assets 
was managed better after merger/acquisition. We do so by including a dummy variable 
for the two pro-forma banks that equals one throughout the sample (Selected for Merger), 
another equal to one beginning at the time of the merger event (At Merger) to capture the 
initial effects of combining the banks and their balance sheets, and another equal to the 
number of quarters since the merger (Time Since Merger) to capture dynamic post-
merger performance effects. These bank ownership categories therefore enable us to fully 
                                                 
28 This reduces the number of observations in the regressions from 908 to 866. 
  19summarize all of the structural changes that occurred in Tanzanian banking over this 
period. Comparing these results with those in the base regressions provides a test of 
whether a full characterization of ownership is necessary, as was demonstrated for the 
case of Argentina (Berger, et al., 2005).  
Results appear in Table 6.  We suppress the coefficients for the control variables 
to conserve space, since we now have so many more ownership variables.   For all four of 
the dependent variables, the signs and significance levels for the coefficients in Table 6 
that pertain to new NBC’s or NMB’s ownership are remarkably similar to those in the 
base results (Table 5). In many cases, the magnitudes of the coefficients are also quite 
similar across the two tables. Therefore, the performance of the new NBC and NMB is 
similar when compared either to that of a stable benchmark, i.e., those private domestic 
banks that appear throughout our sample and were not involved in merger activity, or to 
that of all private domestic banks. This pattern indicates that our base results were not 
driven by the shifting composition of the omitted category.  We speculate that including 
the full set of ownership variables has less effect on our results because there was less 
restructuring in Tanzania than in the Argentine episode studied by Berger, et al. (2005). 
Some of the results for the additional ownership variables, however, are worthy of 
note.  For example, banks that were selected to be part of mergers or acquisitions tended 
to have lower profitability, lend more, and hold fewer government securities than banks 
in the omitted category. Somewhat surprisingly, they also had lower NPL shares. At the 
time of the merger, their NPL shares increased and their loans (relative to assets) 
declined, reflecting perhaps write-offs that accompanied the merger process (see 
coefficients for “Merged” in columns 4, 7, and 8). These adjustments left the merged 
banks no worse off than banks in the omitted category on these measures since the 
“Selected for Merger” and “Merged” coefficients are of opposite signs and similar 
magnitudes.
29  After merger, there was a gradual improvement in profitability (see 
“Quarters Since Merger” coefficient in column 2) and increased holding of government 
securities (columns 5 and 6). Entrants, both foreign and private domestic, began with low 
profitability and few loans relative to assets. In the quarters since entry, profitability has 
                                                 
29 That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the selected for merger and merged coefficients is 
equal to zero. 
  20gradually improved as lending has expanded. Moreover, NPL shares have remained 
about the same as for banks in the omitted category. 
B.  Real Credit Growth 
Figure 6 and the regression results indicate that the ratio of loans to assets was 
increasing for NMB and the new NBC. However, Figure 7 shows that the bulk of the 
increase in total loans was attributable to banks other than NMB and the new NBC, while 
Figure 8 shows their decline in the share of total loans in 1998-99 (especially for NBC), 
shares which remained low throughout the rest of the period. To get a more precise 
estimate of the respective contributions of NMB and the new NBC to Tanzanian credit 
growth, Table 7 offers regressions in which the dependent variable is Real Creditt/ Real 
Creditt-1. The subscript t refers to years. Credit growth measured at year-end was more 
stable than quarterly measures, though this choice did eliminate over three-quarters of the 
observations in the base regressions. We also use the full set of ownership variables that 
were used in the robustness check in Table 6 to better identify which banks were 
responsible for the growth in lending summarized in Figure 7. 
The new NBC’s coefficients are insignificant, indicating that its credit growth was 
and is comparable to private domestic banks that are part of the sample for the full 
period. For NMB, credit growth rates declined precipitously at the time that contract 
management took over and the time of the sale to Rabobank. NMB credit growth rates 
did increase after those events, though the result is only significant for the period under 
contract management.  The bulk of the credit growth is attributable to the private 
domestic entrants, whose growth rates in their first full year of operations were 0.7 points 
higher than banks in the omitted category. For reference, the median value for the 
dependent variable is 1.21, meaning 21% growth in real credit. After the first year, those 
credit growth rates declined by 0.03 points per year, but the gap between the private 
entrants and other banks remains wide.
30 Liberalizing entry was therefore the key to 
credit growth. Had the Tanzanian authorities focused only on restructuring and selling the 
old NBC, credit growth would likely have been much more modest. 
                                                 
30 The coefficients for state-owned entrants also indicate explosive credit growth, but there is only one 
small bank in that category, Dar Es Salaam Community Bank, which entered in 2001. 
  21VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The split of the original National Bank of Commerce and the privatization of its 
two successor banks spanned more than a decade of reforms in the financial sector in 
Tanzania. The privatization is noteworthy for its partition of the original bank’s mandate 
(efficiency and access to services) to two separate banks. We have argued that despite 
considerable setbacks, the relative success of the two successor banks in carrying out 
their mandates could be instructive for privatizations elsewhere. Typically, there are 
tensions between pursuing profitability and extending the outreach of a bank after its 
privatization. In other words, access to banking services, especially among the relatively 
poor, might be sacrificed for the sake of improved efficiency. The case of NBC is similar 
to successful privatizations in other developing countries. Sale to a foreign strategic 
investor resulted in improved profitability and reductions in non-performing loans. 
NBC’s ratio of loans to assets was low at the time of privatization and is slowly 
increasing, while its rate of credit growth is now on par with that of other banks. In that 
sense, NBC’s outreach is not disappointing, though it is far from extraordinary on that 
dimension.  
Unlike NBC, NMB was explicitly created to pursue outreach and its struggles and 
successes are instructive. Finding a private investor proved elusive, and so the bank 
operated under private management consultants for six years. During that time, the bank 
was reasonably profitable but was not able to pursue its mandate aggressively.  Since the 
recent sale of a large share of the bank to a foreign investor (Rabobank of the 
Netherlands), profitability has been maintained and the ratio of loans to total assets has 
begun to increase. This is encouraging, though sufficient time has not elapsed for us to 
draw a firm conclusion about whether the outreach objectives will be achieved.  
Beyond our analysis of bank-level data, there are concrete indications that 
outreach to the rural population has increased and is continuing to do so. Rural deposits 
(those in non-urban bank branches) increased by over 80 percent between 1998 and 2006. 
Outstanding NMB microfinance loans grew to TZS 117 billion (US$ 89.1 million) in 
September 2006 with more than 165,000 borrowers since lending started in August 2000 
(i.e., from a basis of zero). NMB’s network grew from 95 branches in 1997 to 115 
  22branches in 2006, reaching 750,000 depositors.
31 The privatization of the original 
National Bank of Commerce therefore provides an example of how the privatization of a 
large state-owned bank can contribute to sustained improvement of access to financial 
services in rural areas.  
Although it is difficult to assign a precise weight, the enabling environment no 
doubt played a role in the success of the privatization. As noted above, macroeconomic 
stabilization was achieved, with inflation rates falling throughout the late 1990s and 
remaining low thereafter. The privatization also occurred within the context of broad 
parastatal reform. Finally, and as noted above, the Bank of Tanzania permitted substantial 
new entry in the banking sector, which fueled recent growth in credit and other services. 
The influx of private capital into the banking system and rapid growth in the balance 
sheets of the new entrants also speaks to the bankers’ trust in Bank of Tanzania’s 
management of the system. 
Although they have become less important in terms of size (asset share), NBC and 
NMB show additional signs that they are thriving in their new niches. NBC has been 
expanding its branch network, also after the ABSA Group was bought by Barclays in 
2005. At NMB, there appears to be strong commitment on the part of the new 
management (Rabobank) to the original mission, even as products are added for 
enterprises and individuals who demand more sophisticated financial services. At the 
same time, new approaches are being pursued to expand access beyond NMB branches 
using Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) as intermediary customers. For 
example, NMB has begun offering free training courses to SACCOs in order to improve 
their capacity and thus their ability to do business with NMB. A continued focus on 
expanding access and improving service quality has secured the extension of the contract 
with the government for payments transactions. In 2007, NMB added more than 100 
ATMs country-wide to its services and ended the year as the most profitable bank in 
Tanzania.
32 Though the last chapter has yet to be written on the privatization of the 
original National Bank of Commerce, some ten years into the process, and despite 
numerous hiccups, much has been achieved.  
                                                 
31 Source: Bank of Tanzania. 
32 Source: NMB website: www.nmbtz.com as of March 14, 2008 
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Financial Economics, 72(2): 357-84.Table 1: Share of Banking Sector Assets Held by Three Largest Banks 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sub-Saharan Africa 88.8% 85.8% 85.1% 85.5% 82.3% 82.6% 82.4% 81.3% 80.4% 78.5% 78.4% 82.1%
Angola 100.0% 95.6% 80.4% 77.6% 75.2% 74.1%
Benin 100.0% 81.7% 79.5% 85.2% 86.6% 88.7% 81.1% 89.6% 78.2% 87.9% 90.4% 100.0%
Botswana 96.9% 97.2% 97.6% 100.0% 98.6% 93.7% 92.8% 90.6% 83.8% 78.0% 78.4% 94.4%
Burkina Faso 100.0% 94.9% 96.5% 74.6% 69.5% 71.5% 77.1% 75.5% 57.4% 54.7%
Burundi 100.0% 90.3% 87.6% 93.4% 92.5% 89.1% 85.7% 93.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Cameroon 100.0% 100.0% 84.6% 82.2% 74.0% 70.7% 75.6% 71.6% 62.8% 60.6% 57.1%
Cape Verde 100.0% 100.0% 96.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chad 100.0% 100.0%
Congo, Rep. 100.0% 100.0% 93.0% 88.7% 85.9% 80.2% 67.9% 76.1%
Cote d'Ivoire 92.7% 91.6% 86.8% 85.4% 78.7% 77.2% 77.2% 79.3% 71.8% 75.1% 77.1%
Ethiopia 100.0% 100.0% 97.4% 84.2% 75.9% 69.3% 94.1% 89.8% 88.6% 87.9% 85.7% 83.7%
Gabon 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.7% 91.8% 98.7% 100.0%
Gambia, The 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Ghana 91.7% 87.6% 88.9% 92.1% 91.6% 87.9% 84.4% 81.8% 77.2% 72.2% 64.6% 64.3%
Kenya 58.1% 53.4% 50.7% 56.1% 57.5% 59.8% 60.8% 58.4% 57.4% 52.9% 49.0% 54.3%
Lesotho 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Madagascar 100.0% 100.0% 89.2% 85.6% 84.8% 85.6% 86.0% 89.2% 89.5%
Malawi 94.8% 90.3% 96.5% 91.3% 89.8% 88.7% 85.4% 80.4% 90.1% 86.9% 97.2%
Mali 81.0% 81.3% 80.9% 97.3% 87.5% 75.1% 71.7% 86.6% 84.0% 82.8% 95.6%
Mauritania 83.9% 86.7% 100.0% 94.8% 100.0% 82.3% 72.1% 74.9% 78.2%
Mauritius 96.4% 90.7% 85.3% 91.0% 92.5% 84.4% 89.9% 82.1% 72.7% 72.5% 65.8% 95.9%
Mozambique 86.5% 81.3% 82.5% 76.6% 74.8% 79.6% 79.1% 85.9% 82.2% 81.2% 93.5%
Namibia 100.0% 83.3% 82.4% 82.4% 78.1% 79.7% 83.3% 91.3% 86.3% 91.3% 77.5%
Niger 94.3% 100.0% 100.0% 84.7% 82.4% 81.3% 80.6%
Nigeria 64.7% 47.8% 45.1% 38.6% 40.8% 41.4% 38.8% 39.1% 38.7% 38.8% 44.5% 51.1%
Rwanda 100.0% 100.0% 93.2% 100.0% 93.6% 93.5% 91.0% 75.6% 72.5% 77.5%
Senegal 92.5% 72.3% 75.8% 75.0% 70.1% 67.4% 66.7% 63.1% 61.7% 61.5% 64.1%
Seychelles 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Sierra Leone 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 92.2% 93.3% 91.7% 92.8% 92.0% 92.5% 92.1%
South Africa 94.0% 94.9% 91.0% 94.1% 92.6% 92.6% 93.5% 98.9% 99.3% 93.5% 92.0% 98.5%
Sudan 75.1% 74.4% 69.5% 55.9% 65.4% 57.3% 66.2% 73.5% 79.9%
Swaziland 100.0% 100.0% 91.9% 90.5% 80.2% 76.2% 77.1% 91.5%
Tanzania 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 96.4% 98.6% 95.2% 95.9% 49.6% 51.1% 69.1%
Togo 84.0% 83.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Uganda 69.1% 46.5% 48.4% 58.5% 63.7% 62.6% 57.9% 65.2% 64.6% 62.6% 58.7% 68.2%
Zambia 80.6% 77.2% 86.1% 65.8% 69.0% 65.8% 62.1% 60.3% 58.0% 59.9% 58.8% 67.1%
Zimbabwe 73.7% 78.0% 75.2% 74.8% 77.9% 61.0% 50.8% 57.3% 73.2% 83.0% 81.1%
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 72.5% 72.9% 73.2% 72.1% 70.1% 71.7% 70.5% 68.5% 68.5% 68.0% 68.7% 70.9%
East Asia & Pacific 66.8% 64.4% 70.2% 66.3% 74.5% 78.3% 75.0% 68.6% 64.4% 61.4% 57.3% 63.0%
Europe & Central Asia 74.2% 75.8% 74.4% 72.2% 69.3% 70.0% 68.3% 64.7% 62.1% 63.0% 62.6% 75.7%
Latin America & Caribbean 61.6% 61.2% 61.4% 60.3% 58.0% 58.8% 57.0% 57.6% 62.8% 62.7% 66.2% 59.3%
Middle East & North Africa 66.3% 69.3% 68.3% 71.2% 68.8% 70.1% 70.7% 69.0% 68.5% 72.4% 74.6% 81.3%
South Asia 66.9% 63.2% 62.8% 59.9% 57.5% 57.6% 56.2% 52.7% 49.4% 47.5% 47.3% 50.6%
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Table 2: Share of Banking Sector Assets Held by Majority State-Owned Banks 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sub-Saharan Africa 33.6% 31.1% 26.9% 25.8% 22.0% 13.9% 14.3% 13.9%
Angola 59.3% 54.8%
Benin 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 4.5%
Botswana 3.6% 4.1% 4.3% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Burkina Faso 20.7% 18.6% 22.0% 21.1% 23.0%
Burundi 18.6% 18.4% 16.7% 17.2% 16.5% 5.2% 5.1% 4.7%
Cameroon 13.9% 13.8% 14.0% 3.1% 0.0% 3.2%
Cote d'Ivoire 61.7% 63.0% 61.5% 57.7% 7.3% 8.5% 8.3% 8.1%
Ethiopia 98.7% 98.1% 94.9% 93.1% 89.5% 86.7% 84.9% 82.6%
Ghana 67.6% 46.5% 24.9% 25.1% 23.0% 11.7% 16.3% 15.8%
Kenya 15.4% 15.1% 14.1% 10.7% 11.2% 10.4% 9.0% 8.0%
Lesotho 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Madagascar 42.4% 20.0% 18.5% 17.9% 18.7%
Malawi 9.2% 9.1% 9.2% 9.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Mali 38.3% 38.2% 37.4% 37.5% 37.8% 16.9% 15.3% 16.8%
Mauritius 39.4% 24.9% 23.3% 19.3% 14.7% 16.5% 16.9% 20.3%
Mozambique 45.8% 29.0% 27.7% 24.8% 25.3% 13.1% 11.3%
Namibia 0.0% 0.0% 5.5% 6.0% 0.0% 6.3% 6.5% 8.1%
Niger 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Nigeria 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 5.3% 1.7%
Rwanda 23.4% 23.1% 24.4% 21.6%
Senegal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.1%
Seychelles 78.4% 79.4% 79.7% 79.9%
Sierra Leone 70.6% 66.8% 68.1% 48.5% 46.4% 49.6%
South Africa 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.7% 2.3% 2.7% 2.3% 2.6%
Sudan 23.4% 27.5% 22.9% 14.6% 11.3% 9.6%
Swaziland 2.8% 3.2% 2.1%
Tanzania 74.0% 50.8% 43.9% 37.7% 10.1% 9.4% 8.8%
Uganda 47.4% 38.0% 38.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Zambia 43.1% 44.9% 2.8% 36.0% 32.8% 22.6% 22.9% 23.7%
Zimbabwe 26.0% 29.9% 21.3% 22.8% 18.3% 21.8% 17.2% 9.1%
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 40.4% 36.6% 32.8% 30.2% 27.8% 24.1% 21.1% 20.0%
East Asia & Pacific 43.2% 43.3% 43.8% 43.2% 41.8% 41.1% 40.0% 33.8%
Europe & Central Asia 53.7% 42.2% 39.5% 35.2% 29.9% 23.7% 20.7% 18.1%
Latin America & Caribbean 33.4% 32.7% 26.4% 22.9% 23.3% 19.8% 16.3% 15.8%
Middle East & North Africa 31.4% 29.1% 27.4% 25.5% 25.3% 34.4% 24.1% 29.9%
South Asia 56.9% 55.1% 52.3% 51.5% 50.5% 50.7% 46.9% 43.7% 
 





#banks end  Assets  NPL Share  ROA 
Private 
Domestic 
8  12  TZS 55 billion 
 
Dec 97: 32.5 bn 
Dec 06: 108bn 
7.08% 
 
Dec 97: 3.12% 
Dec 06: 3.71% 
0.71% 
 
Dec 97: 0.62% 
Dec 06: 1.93% 
Foreign-
owned 
10 14 TZS  109  bn 
 
Dec 97: 26.6 bn 
Dec 06: 213 bn 
6.31% 
 
Dec 97: 6.55% 
Dec 06: 5.12% 
-0.02% 
 
Dec 97: 1.20% 
Dec 06: 1.12% 
State-owned  7 6 TZS  100  bn 
 
Dec 97: 122 bn 
Dec 06: 154 bn 
15.50% 
 
Dec 97: 30.41% 
Dec 06: 6.30% 
0.55% 
 
Dec 97: 0.81% 





Table 4: Summary Statistics 







ROA  0.35% 0.81% 0.05% 1.77% 12.32%  -25.96% 
NPL  Share  8.31% 3.19% 1.25% 9.38% 97.55%  0% 
Government 
Securities/Assets 
15.26% 9.58%  2.62%  22.79% 76.81% 0% 
Loans/Assets  40.73% 40.68% 26.50% 53.21% 112%    0.02% 
Total Assets  88.2 bn  18.2 bn  5.8 bn  60 bn  898 bn  0 
Private domestic  35%  -   -   -   -   -  
Foreign-owned  45%  -   -   -   -   -  
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Table 5: Regression Results 
Dep Var: ROA  Dep Var: NPL  Dep Var: Govt   Dep Var: 
               Securities/Assets  Loans/Assets 
Explanatory Variable  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS  
    Clustered Median  Clustered Median Clustered  Median Clustered  Median 
    SE Regression  SE Regression SE  Regression SE  Regression 
NBC: Pre-Privatization  -0.021  -0.016** 0.204**  0.292*** -0.319** -0.274***  0.022  0.044 
    (0.98) (2.38)  (2.64) (14.12)  (2.61) (3.82)  (0.18) (0.50) 
NBC: At Privatization  0.026  0.024***  0.109 -0.127***  0.297***  0.404***  -0.182*  -0.195* 
    (1.57) (2.87)  (1.48) (5.04) (3.01)  (4.60) (1.94)  (1.87) 
NBC: Time Since Privatization  -0.0003  -0.0001 -0.017***  -0.008***  0.003** -0.002  0.013***  0.010*** 
   (0.68)  (0.48)  (10.38)  (8.83) (2.39)  (0.56) (6.56)  (2.71) 
NMB: Creation, Contract   -0.003  -0.004 -0.184**  -0.094***  0.337*** 0.307***  -0.283***  -0.193*** 
           Management  (0.25)  (0.79)  (2.31) (6.10)  (3.71) (5.42)  (3.69) (2.85) 
NMB: Time Since Creation  -0.0001  0.0005 0.001  0.0002 -0.003  0.0002 0.008**  0.004 
    (0.18) (1.54)  (0.54) (0.21) (1.05)  (0.07) (2.57)  (0.88) 
NMB: Sale to Rabobank  -0.016**  -0.003  0.011 0.002  0.126***  0.102*  0.006 -0.008 
    (2.60) (0.22)  (0.55) (0.08) (9.46)  (1.78) (0.26)  (0.06) 
NMB: Time Since Sale to  0.003***  0.002 -0.002 0.0003  -0.029***  -0.031**  0.012***  0.023 
Rabobank  (3.87) (0.59)  (0.51) (0.03) (7.41)  (2.11) (2.70)  (0.59) 
Loans/Assets  0.015  0.009*** 0.324**  0.101***          
    (0.53) (3.23)  (2.45) (12.24)           
Govt.  Securities/Assets  0.023 -0.001  0.157 0.038***           
    (0.93) (0.25)  (1.52) (3.48)           
Total Assets (Trillions)  0.037*  0.014*** 0.080  0.056*** 0.165  0.161*** -0.362*** -0.277*** 
    (1.84) (3.50)  (1.41) (4.81) (1.28)  (4.09) (2.77)  (5.74) 
Foreign-Owned -0.008  -0.003***  0.002  -0.019***  -0.004 0.010 -0.038 -0.064*** 
    (1.36) (3.50)  (0.09) (6.49) (0.13)  (1.00) (0.80)  (5.07) 
Govt-Owned -0.003  0.001  0.141*  0.053*** 0.097  0.114*** -0.130*  -0.180*** 
    (0.36) (0.75)  (1.79) (12.89)  (1.14) (8.14)  (1.87) (10.58) 
1999  0.006     -0.005     -0.017     0.034   
   (1.07)     (0.27)     (0.72)     (0.94)   
2000   -0.001   0.004   0.010   -0.013 
     (0.68)   (0.65)   (0.50)   (0.53) 
2001 -0.010  -0.005***  0.028  0.012**  -0.004 0.012 0.0005 -0.011 
    (1.31) (2.89)  (1.43) (2.20) (0.26)  (0.61) (0.02)  (0.48) 
2002 -0.015  -0.008***  0.014  0.005  -0.037* -0.040**  0.023  0.026 
    (1.50) (4.61)  (0.53) (0.91) (1.77)  (2.14) (0.75)  (1.14) 
2003  -0.006 -0.007***  -0.004 -0.012** -0.069***  -0.052***  0.052*  0.060*** 
    (0.85) (3.97)  (0.14) (2.29) (2.99)  (2.79) (1.87)  (2.65) 
2004 0.005  -0.005**  -0.038  -0.019*** -0.083***  -0.058*** 0.085**  0.110*** 
    (0.76) (2.54)  (1.52) (3.61) (3.50)  (3.12) (2.67)  (4.85) 
2005 0.006  -0.002  -0.069**  -0.023*** -0.072**  -0.054*** 0.099**  0.133*** 
    (0.98) (1.40)  (2.14) (4.34) (2.59)  (2.90) (2.66)  (5.83) 
2006 0.005  -0.002  -0.065**  0.014***  -0.063* -0.045**  0.111***  0.105*** 
    (0.74) (0.88)  (2.14) (2.57) (1.95)  (2.33) (2.86)  (4.46) 
Constant -0.004  0.012***  -0.089  0.002  0.147*** 0.080***  0.441*** 0.443*** 
    (0.22) (4.93)  (1.19) (0.30) (5.29)  (4.36) (9.51)  (19.76) 
                     
#  Observations  908 908  908 908  908 908  908 908 
R-Square 0.1  0.07  0.29  0.11 0.33  0.19 0.23  0.18 
*, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. All models include quarter 
dummies. 
 Table 6: Robustness Checks 
   Dep Var: ROA  Dep Var: NPL 
Dep Var: Govt 
Securities/Assets    Dep Var: Loans/Assets  
Explanatory Variable  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS  
    Clustered Median  Clustered Median Clustered  Median Clustered  Median 
    SE Regression  SE Regression SE  Regression SE  Regression 
NBC:  Pre-Privatization  -0.028 -0.016*  0.361**  0.362***  -0.230***  -0.190***  -0.075 -0.053 
    (1.58) (1.90) (7.30) (13.35)  (2.80) (6.25) (0.99) (0.79) 
NBC: At Privatization  0.019*  0.017  -0.024  -0.221***  0.194***  0.289***  -0.126***  -0.138* 
    (1.92) (1.62) (0.75) (6.83) (4.87) (7.85) (3.18) (1.71) 
NBC: Time Since Privatization  0.0003  0.00002 -0.019***  -0.008**  0.003** -0.002  0.014***  0.012*** 
    (0.49) (0.05) (9.61) (6.54) (1.79) (1.19) (7.33) (4.14) 
NMB: Creation, Contract   -0.007  -0.005  0.003  -0.046**  0.400***  0.404***  -0.396***  -0.357*** 
           Management  (0.69)  (0.79)  (0.06)  (2.21)  (8.21)  (16.77)  (8.89)  (7.03) 
NMB:  Time  Since  Creation  0.0004 0.0006 -0.002 0.0002 -0.002 0.0004 0.008***  0.005 
    (0.79) (1.61) (1.11) (0.17) (0.72) (0.29) (3.07) (1.60) 
NMB: Sale to Rabobank  -0.009  -0.010  0.006  0.002  0.131***  0.123*  0.023  0.042 
    (1.62) (0.64) (0.30) (0.04) (7.95) (2.33) (1.21) (0.51 
NMB: Time Since Sale to  0.003***  0.003  -0.003  0.001  -0.030***  -0.032**  0.017***  0.022 
Rabobank  (3.52) (0.82) (0.75) (0.08) (7.78) (2.40) (4.02) (1.16) 
Loans/Assets  0.013  0.011*** 0.376**  0.080***        
    (0.56) (2.81) (2.65) (6.11)        
Govt. Securities/Assets  0.004 -0.004  0.166 0.042***         
    (0.16) (0.93) (1.52) (2.75)        
Total  Assets  (Trillions)  0.025  0.012** 0.128*  0.037** 0.106  0.112***  -0.358***  -0.393*** 
    (1.50) (2.20) (1.89) (2.14) (0.80) (5.92) (3.70) (9.43) 
Foreign:  Full  Sample  -0.003 -0.003**  -0.005 -0.023***  -0.006 0.024***  -0.061 -0.092*** 
  (0.62) (2.04) (0.24) (4.27) (0.11) (3.96) (1.38) (6.97) 
State: Full Sample  -0.001  -0.004  0.184**  0.078***  0.081  0.091***  -0.141*  -0.208*** 
  (0.07) (0.20) (2.02) (11.87)  (0.77) (12.59)  (1.97) (13.20) 
Selected for Merger  -0.021***  -0.009**  -0.047*  -0.040***  -0.140***  -0.083***  0.158***  0.202*** 
  (5.07) (2.41) (1.69) (3.31) (2.97) (6.33) (5.22) (6.91) 
Merged  0.007 -0.006  0.048 0.044**  0.053***  0.018 -0.159**  -0.236*** 
  (0.38) (0.92) (1.35) (2.16) (4.97) (0.77) (2.36) (4.66) 
Quarters  Since  Merger  0.001  0.002***  -0.002 -0.003*  0.008***  0.009***  -0.002 -0.003 
  (1.26) (2.88) (0.93) (1.66) (4.57) (4.37) (0.58) (0.72) 
Foreign  Entry  -0.040**  -0.025*** 0.091  -0.035*** -0.022  -0.058*** -0.255*** -0.281*** 
  (2.10) (7.28) (0.92) (3.24) (0.34) (4.91) (2.90) (10.77) 
Quarters Since Foreign Entry  0.002*  0.001***  -0.007  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  0.020***  0.019*** 
  (1.97) (3.50) (1.26) (0.98) (1.20) (0.37) (3.12) (9.94) 
Private  Entry  -0.028*** -0.015*** 0.070  -0.003  -0.068  -0.096*** -0.091  -0.074*** 
  (3.14) (4.67) (1.47) (0.32) (1.04) (8.58) (0.75) (2.97) 
Quarters  Since  Private  Entry  0.002*** 0.001*** -0.005** 0.00001  -0.002  0.0005  0.012*** 0.010*** 
  (2.74) (3.75) (2.25) (0.01) (0.97) (0.69) (3.35) (6.65) 
State  Entry  -0.121*** -0.043*** 0.022  -0.027  -0.075  -0.008  -0.266*** -0.168*** 
  (13.53)  (5.66) (0.43) (1.09) (1.35) (0.29) (6.67) (2.90) 
Quarters  Since  State  Entry  0.009*** 0.003*** -0.006*  -0.0005  0.001  -0.002  0.026*** 0.016*** 
  (11.69)  (4.03) (1.70) (0.23) (0.46) (0.87) (9.36) (3.24) 
 Failed  -0.054  -0.016***  0.181*  0.109***  -0.139***  -0.112***  0.227**  0.224*** 
  (1.53) (4.55) (1.83) (9.81) (2.93) (9.33) (2.34) (8.36) 
Constant  0.001 0.007**  -0.160*  0.007 0.152***  0.103***  0.490***  0.531*** 
  (0.08) (2.05) (1.78) (0.68) (3.42) (11.92)  (14.48)  (28.38) 
#  Observations  866 866 866 866 866 866 866 866 
R-Square
a  0.26 0.11 0.40 0.18 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.30 
aPseudo R-square is reported for the median regressions in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels. All models include year and quarter dummy variables. 
  28 
Table 7: Credit Growth 
Dep Var: Real Credit 
Growth 
        
Explanatory Variable  OLS Robust 
   Clustered  Regression 
   SE   
NBC: At Privatization  -0.214  -0.174 
   (1.23)  (0.73) 
NBC: Time Since Privatization  0.008  0.003 
   (0.92)  (0.27) 
NMB: Creation, Contract   -1.155***  -2.310*** 
           Management  (4.88)  (6.74) 
NMB: Time Since Creation  0.096***  0.133*** 
   (7.74)  (6.77) 
NMB: Sale to Rabobank  -2.000***  -1.950*** 
   (21.28)  (3.95) 
NMB: Time Since Sale to  0.053  0.006 
Rabobank (1.64)  (0.05) 
Loans/Assets 0.288  0.306 
   (0.63)  (1.48) 
Govt. Securities/Assets  0.234  0.153 
   (0.76)  (0.71) 
Total Assets (Trillions)  0.002  0.263 
   (0.01)  (1.30) 
Foreign: Full Sample  0.017  -0.031 
 (0.13)  (0.46) 
State: Full Sample  -0.060  0.009 
 (0.42)  (0.10) 
Selected for Merger  -0.254**  -0.142 
 (2.20)  (0.85) 
Merged -0.056  -0.102 
 (0.52)  (0.34) 
Years Since Merger  0.019***  0.019 
 (3.08)  (0.84) 
Foreign Entry  0.666  -0.011 
 (1.16)  (0.05) 
Years Since Foreign Entry  -0.030  -0.006 
 (1.09)  (0.47) 
Private Entry  0.781*  0.688*** 
 (1.98)  (3.99) 
Years Since Private Entry  -0.025  -0.025*** 
 (1.62)  (2.77) 
State Entry  2.192***  2.967*** 
 (10.84)  (6.02) 
Years Since State Entry  -0.116***  -0.152*** 
 (9.37)  (4.25) 
 Failed  -0.159  -0.111 
 (0.69)  (0.06) 
Constant 1.007***  0.839*** 
 (3.53)  (6.30) 
# Observations  197  197 
R-Square 0.29  0.48 
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Figure 7: Total Loans            Figure 8: Share of Total Banking Sector Loans  
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